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TELEGRAM

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HCF809

PAGE 01 TAIPEI 02877 311406Z

43

ACTION SS 70

INFO OCT 01, CIAE 00, /071 W

122552

R 310800Z JUL 69

FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8098

S E C R E T TAIPEI 2877

LIMDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT)

SUBJ: STAFFDEL PINCUS AND PAUL

REF: STATE 99861

1. STAFFDEL PINCUS AND PAUL SPENT BULK OF FOUR-DAY VISIT TO TAIWAN WITH US MILITARY AUTHORITIES, INCLUDING VISITS TO CCK AND TAINAN AIR BASES AND QUEMOY (LATTER UNDER MND AUSPICES). USTDC HAS REPORTED THEIR CONVERSATIONS WITH VARIOUS MILITARY UNITS TO JCS. DURING FIRST DAY OF VISIT, PINCUS AND PAUL MET WITH AMBASSADOR, DCM, POLITICAL COUNSELOR, AND ECONOMIC COUNSELOR FOR OVER TWO HOURS. IN RESPONSE THEIR REQUEST, EMBOFFS GAVE STAFFDEL FULL BUT INFORMAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC BRIEFING. FOLLOWING ARE SIGNIFICANT SUBJECTS COVERED DURING SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION.

A. RECENT GRC RAID ON MAINLAND: THEY ASKED IF GRC HAD INFORMED US GOVERNMENT IN ADVANCE AND WHAT EMBASSY'S REACTION HAD BEEN. AMBASSADOR REVIEWED HIS JULY 4 REPRESENTATIONS TO CCK AND CCK'S REPLY. STAFFDEL SEEMED CONCERNED SUCH GRC RAID MIGHT PORVOKE CHICOM RESPONSE WHICH COULD LEAD TO US INVOLVEMENT. THEY ASKED HOW US WOULD RESPOND TO ANY CHICOM RETALIATION. THERE WAS A GENERAL DISCUSSION OF THIS HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION, WHICH OF COURSE COULD NOT BE PRECISELY ANSWERED. THEY WANTED TO KNOW IF SUCH A RAID FELL WITHIN SCOPE OF 1954 EXCHANGE OF NOTES. WE REPLIED THAT THERE WAS NO PRECISE DEFINITION OF TYPES OF

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PAGE 02 TAIPEI 02877 311406Z

ACTION COVERED BY EXCHANGE OF NOTES, AND IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO DEVISE SUCH A DEFINITION. HOWEVER, WE FELT GRC RECOGNIZED ITS OBLIGATIONS TO CONSULT USG IF CONTEMPLATED ACTION COULD REASONABLY BE CONSIDERED SUFFICIENTLY PROVOCATIVE BY CHICOMS TO BRING MAJOR CHICOM RETALIATION. IN LATER AFTER-DINNER CONVERSATION WITH COMTDC, CHMAAG, DCM, THEY PRESSED HARD ON HOW WE KNEW THAT GRC DOES NOT ASSUME US WOULD COME TO GRC ASSISTANCE IF CHICOMS RETALIATED, EVEN IN A RELATIVELY MINOR WAY, TO SOME GRC ACTION. WE RESPONDED THAT ALTHOUGH THIS WAS NOT SOMETHING THAT COULD BE FORMALIZED, WE WERE CONFIDENT THAT THE GRC WAS FULLY AWARE OF OUR POSITION.

B. JOINT US/GRC MILITARY EXERCISES: STAFFDEL ASKED HOW EMBASSY MONITORS JOINT US/GRC EXERCISES; IN PARTICULAR THE RECENT SPECIAL FORCES EXERCISE FORWARD THRUST. THEY HAD GAINED IMPRESSION FROM CONVERSATIONS IN OKINAWA THAT SCENARIO SUGGESTIVE OF TRAINING OF GRC SPECIAL FORCES FOR MAINLAND RAIDS. WE TOLD STAFFDEL EMBASSY INFORMED ABOUT BUT DOES NOT CLOSELY MONITOR THESE ROUTINE ANNUAL DRILLS. TDC BELIEVES THEIR DETAILED BRIEFINGS ON FORWARD THRUST CORRECTED STAFFDEL'S IMPRESSION. (N.B. WE BELIEVE THAT SCENARIO COULD BE ALTERED NEXT YEAR SO AS TO AVOID MISUNDERSTANDING ON THIS SCORE.)

C. OTHER, MORE GENERAL QUESTIONS STAFFDEL ASKED CONCERNED STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF TAIWAN, US GOVERNMENT ATTITUDE TOWARD MORE REPRESSIVE ASPECTS GRC REGIME, AND IMPORTANCE OF OFFSHORE ISLANDS.

2. IN GENERAL, IN CONVERSATIONS WITH EMBOFFS AND WITH US MILITARY AUTHORITIES, PINCUS AND PAUL SEEMED ANXIOUS TO DETERMINE IF US HAD INCURRED COMMITMENTS TO GRC GOING BEYOND THOSE OF MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY. THEY SEEMED CONCERNED US AUTHORITIES, ORALLY, IN WRITING, OR MERELY BY THEIR ACTIONS HAD AGREED OR GIVEN GRC IMPRESSION US WOULD PROVIDE GRC ASSISTANCE IN ADDITION TO THAT CONTEMPLATED BY TREATY. IN INFORMAL COMMENT TO EMBOFF SHORTLY BEFORE DEPARTURE, THEY INDICATED SKEPTICISM THAT BUILD-UP OF CCK AIRBASE FACILITIES WAS SOLELY FOR VIETNAM SUPPORT PURPOSES, IMPLYING THAT THEY THOUGHT THAT SOME PEOPLE EXPECT THAT IT WOULD BE USED LATER FOR OTHER PURPOSES, E.G. IN CONNECTION WITH OKINAWA REVERSION.

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PAGE 03 TAIPEI 02877 311406Z
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3. STAFFDEL ALSO ASKED ABOUT VANGUARD PROGRAM AND
EMBASSY PREPARED BRIEF MEMORANDUM FOR THEM
OUTLINING US AND GRC CONTRIBUTIONS. ONLY OTHER DOCUMENT
FURNISHED STAFFDEL BY EMBASSY WAS BRIEF MEMO OUTLINING
USIS RELATIONSHIP WITH SEVENTH PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
GROUP. EMBASSY WILL POUCH COPIES OF THESE MEMOS TO
EA/ROC. STAFFDEL REQUESTED ONE ADDITIONAL DOCUMENT
WHICH WILL BE SUBJECT SEPTTEL. GP-1.
MCCONAUGHY
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B. U. O. LIMDIS

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PAGE 01 MANILA 09024 250455Z

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ACTION SS 70

INFO OCT 01, CIAE 00, /071 W

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R 250416Z AUG 69
FM AMEMBASSY MANILA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 801

S E C R E T MANILA 9024

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FM CINCPAC AUG 24, REPEATED H/W FOR YOUR INFO
LIMDIS
QUOTE

TO CINCPACREPPHIL
JCS

INFO AMEMBASSY MANILA

S E C R E T PINCUS AND PAUL VISIT (U)

A. AMEMB MANILA 8923/210802Z AUG 69

1. REF A, A WRAP-UP OF THE PINCUS AND PAUL VISIT TO THE PHILIPPINES, MADE REFERENCE TO A STATEMENT IN THE 26 JUNE MDB INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE MEETING MINUTES THAT THE US WOULD BE A CUSTOMER FOR THE PROPOSED ROK M-16 FACTORY.

2. THE PURPOSE OF THE PROPOSED M-16 FACTORY IS TO EQUIP THE ROK FORCES WITH M-16 RIFLES THAT CANNOT BE OTHERWISE FUNDED FROM KOREA MAP. IT IS IN NO WAY INTENDED THAT THE US OR THIRD COUNTRIES WOULD BE CUSTOMERS OF THE PROPOSED PLANT IN KOREA.

3. FOR CINCPACREPPHIL: REQUEST APPROPRIATE ACTION BE TAKEN TO CORRECT THIS ERRONEOUS INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION.

4. FOR JCS: RECOMMEND THAT PINCUS AND PAUL BE ADVISED THAT THEY WERE CORRECTLY BRIEFED IN KOREA ON THE PROPOSED M-16 FACTORY AND THAT INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THE MDB INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE MEETING MINUTES OF 26 JUNE 68 WAS INCORRECT.

GP-4

UNQUOTE

BYROADE

BT

NOTE: LIMDIS CAPTION ADDED PER S/S-O, MR. MORTON, 08/25/69.

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PAGE 01 MANILA 08923 01 OF 02 210906Z

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ACTION SS 70

INFO OCT 01, CIAE 00, /071 W

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R 210802Z AUG 69
FM AMEMBASSY MANILA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 749
INFO CINCPAC
CINCPACREPPHIL
CG 13TH AIRFORCE
COMNAVBASE SUBIC

SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 MANILA 8923

NOFORN

LINDIS

JOINT EMBASSY/CINCPACREPPHIL MESSAGE.

SUBJECT: PINCUS/PAUL VISIT TO PHILIPPINES

1. PINCUS AND PAUL INQUIRED IN DETAIL ABOUT WHAT MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS THERE ARE IN THE PHILIPPINES, THEIR SIZE EQUIPMENT, AND THEIR ACTIVITIES. UNDERLYING THESE QUESTIONS WERE AT LEAST TWO MAJOR THEMES, AS WELL AS NUMBER OF SPECIFIC ISSUES. ONE THEME WAS WHETHER ALL OF THE ORGANIZATIONS AND PERSONNEL ARE NECESSARY NOW AND WHETHER THEY WILL BE NECESSARY POST-VIETNAM. ANOTHER THEME WAS ON US MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS' ACTIVITIES WHICH MIGHT LEAD TO US INVOLVEMENT IN FUTURE HOSTILITIES IN PHILIPPINES OR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

2. IS IT ALL NECESSARY? IN THEIR QUESTIONS ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES AND PERSONNEL STRENGTHS OF MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS IN PHILIPPINES, PINCUS AND PAUL APPEARED TO BE LOOKING FOR OVER-STAFFING, REDUNDANCY, AND DUPLICATION. FOR EXAMPLE, THEY SEEMED PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN ALL COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES AND GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT NOT ONLY IS THERE OVER-STAFFING WITHIN SOME OF THE COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES BUT THAT THE NAVY AND AIR FORCE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS WERE DUPLICATIVE OF ONE ANOTHER TO CERTAIN EXTENT.

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PAGE 02 MANILA 08923 01 OF 02 210906Z
HOWEVER, WHEN GIVEN A SHORT BRIEFING BY DCA, NO QUESTIONS WERE ASKED. THEY ALSO COMMENTED ON THE NECESSITY OF MAINTAINING SEPARATE CINCPACREPPHIL/COMNAVPHIL STAFF, AND WONDERED WHETHER THESE FUNCTIONS COULD NOT BE COMBINED WITH THOSE OF THE ADMIRAL AT NAVBASE SUBIC. THEY RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT PRESENT NEED FOR TWO SPECIFIC INSTALLATIONS: (A) JOHN HAY -- WHILE WEATHER MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THEM TO VISIT JOHN HAY, THEY GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THEY WERE NOT CONVINCED THAT CONTINUED US TENURE OF JOHN HAY IS NECESSARY. (B) MACTAN -- IN THEIR BRIEFING THEY WERE TOLD THAT MACTAN WAS ACTIVATED FOR PURPOSE OF HANDLING SUPPLY FLIGHTS TO VIETNAM. THEY WERE TOLD THAT SUPPLY FLIGHTS TO VIETNAM ARE NOW APPROXIMATELY ONE HUNDRED A MONTH OR SLIGHTLY MORE THAN THREE PER DAY. IN RESPECT TO THESE FLIGHTS, FUNCTION OF THE DETACHMENT AT MACTAN IS TO FUEL THE AIRCRAFT AND PROVIDE QUARTERS FOR THEIR CREWS TO SLEEP OVERNIGHT. TO ACCOMPLISH THIS TASK MACTAN HAS APPROXIMATELY 550 AMERICANS, APPROXIMATELY 200 FILIPINO EMPLOYEES, (AFA AND NAFA). AND APPROXIMATELY 190 CONTRACT EMPLOYEES. PINCUS AND PAUL COMMENTED TO THEIR ESCORT OFFICER THAT NO ONE COULD DOUBT THAT MACTAN SHOULD BE CLOSED IMMEDIATELY. THEY ALSO COMMENTED THAT THEY COULD SEE NO REASON WHY CLARK COULD NOT ABSORB THIS SMALL NUMBER OF FLIGHTS. (C) LORAN STATIONS -- PINCUS AND PAUL'S QUESTIONS ON THIS SUBJECT, AND THEIR QUESTIONS ON THE RELATIVE DIFFICULTY OF TRAINING FILIPINOS TO OPERATE ACW AND LORAN STATIONS, INDICATED THAT THEY THOUGHT PHILIPPINES SHOULD BE OPERATING THESE LORAN SITES.

3. WHAT WILL BE NECESSARY POST-VIETNAM? EVERYWHERE THEY WENT, PINCUS AND PAUL ASKED ABOUT T-DAY PLANNING. THE ANSWERS THEY RECEIVED WERE THAT LOCAL COMMANDERS HAVE NOT RECEIVED DEFINITIVE WORD FROM HIGHER LEVEL ON WHAT WILL BE REQUIRED IN PHILIPPINES POST-VIETNAM. WITHOUT SUCH WORD, IT IS OBVIOUSLY DIFFICULT TO DO ANY PLANNING. NEVERTHELESS FROM THEIR COMMENTS, IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT PINCUS AND PAUL WILL REMAIN CRITICAL OF US FOR NOT HAVING CLEARER IDEAS ON THIS SUBJECT THAN IN FACT WE HAVE.

4. INVOLVEMENT IN FUTURE HOSTILITIES: IN THEIR INITIAL CALL AT EMBASSY, PINCUS AND PAUL WERE TOLD ABOUT PROVISION IN THE BOHLEN-SERRANO AGREEMENT (1959) THAT THERE WOULD BE NO

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PAGE 01 MANILA 08923 02 OF 02 211202Z

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ACTION SS 70

INFO OCT 01, CIAE 00, /071 W

----- 128425

R 210802Z AUG 69
 FM AMEMBASSY MANILA
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC 750
 INFO CINCPAC
 CINCPACREPPHIL
 CG 13TH AIRFORCE
 CM NAVBASE SUBIC

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 MANILA 8923

C O R R E C T E D - C O P Y (TEXT)

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5. PINCUS AND PAUL SHOWED GREAT INTEREST IN HUK SITUATION. THEIR CONCERN SEEMED TO BE THAT WE MIGHT GET GRADUALLY MORE AND MORE INVOLVED WITH PHILIPPINE FORCES IN EFFORTS TO COUNTER HUK THREAT WITH POSSIBILITY THAT IN FUTURE WE MAY BE ENGAGED IN A VIETNAM KIND OF SITUATION. FOR EXAMPLE, THEY FOUND IN THE MDB MINUTES STATEMENT BY GENERAL RAVAL THANKING THE AMERICAN CO-CHAIRMAN FOR THE HELICOPTER ASSISTANCE AND THE INVALUABLE AIR TO GROUND COMMUNICATIONS WHICH CLARK SUPPLIED TO THE PC DURING THE BATTLE OF ORANI IN JANUARY 1969. UNFORTUNATELY, PINCUS AND PAUL GOT SEVERAL DIFFERENT EVALUATIONS OF THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF HUK THREAT AND WE SHALL UNDOUBTEDLY BE ASKED FOR A FURTHER COORDINATED EVALUATION.

6. PINCUS AND PAUL ALSO SEEMED TO SHOW INTEREST IN POSSIBILITY THAT A MARINE COMBAT GROUP MIGHT BE PERMANENTLY STATIONED AT SUBIC IN THE POST-VIETNAM PERIOD.

7. SANGLEY. PINCUS AND PAUL ASKED REPEATEDLY ABOUT PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN POSSIBILITY OF MOVING THE ASW SQUADRONS FROM SANGLEY

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PAGE 02 MANILA 08923 02 OF 02 211202Z

WERE BASED ON AN ASSUMPTION THAT PRESENT LEVELS OF ACTIVITY WOULD BE MAINTAINED. THEY DID NOT APPEAR SATISFIED WITH ANSWERS TO THEIR QUESTIONS ABOUT COST OF AND PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN MAKING SUCH A MOVE AT PRE-TONKIN GULF LEVELS OF ACTIVITY.

8. M-16 FACTORY IN KOREA. PINCUS AND PAUL EXPRESSED SURPRISE (BUT DID NOT COMMENT) ON STATEMENT IN MINUTES OF JUNE 26 MEETING OF MDB INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE TO EFFECT THAT M-16 FACTORY IN KOREA REPRESENTS NO CHANGE IN US POLICY AND US WOULD BE CUSTOMER FOR FACTORY'S PRODUCTION. WE NOTE IN COMUS KOREA 101517Z JULY 69 THAT PINCUS AND PAUL WERE TOLD THERE THAT FACTORY IS INTENDED TO FILL GAP THAT MAP CAN'T FILL AND THAT IT WILL "TRANSFER SMALL ARMS RESPONSIBILITY TO ROKG".
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ACTION EA 15

INFO OCT 01, JPM 04, DODE 00, L 03, H 02, CIAE 00, INR 07, NSAE 00, RSC 01,
RSR 01, /034 W

----- 120142

P 310639Z JUL 69

FM AMEMBASSY MANILA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 325

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANILA 8098

SUBJECT: SAN MIGUEL NAVY COMMUNICATION STATION ZAMBELES

ATTENTION: EA/PHIL USHER.

1. IN PREPARATION FOR PINCUS/PAUL VISIT WE HAVE ATTEMPTED
TO LOCATE AGREEMENT WITH GOP FIXING STATUS AND TENURE
SAN MIGUEL. UNFORTUNATELY WE HAVE RECORD OF EFFORT TO
NEGOTIATE AN AGREEMENT BUT NO RECORD OF AGREEMENT ITSELF.
IF POSSIBLE WOULD APPRECIATE CLARIFICATION BY OPENING
BUSINESS AUGUST 1.

WILSON
BT

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